Civil service rules governing the selection and motivation of bureaucrats are among the de…ning institutions of modern democracies. Although this is an active area of reform in the US and elsewhere, economic analyses of the issue are virtually nonexistent. This paper provides a welfare evaluation of civil service reform. It describes the e¤ect of reform on the interaction of politicians, voters, and bureaucrats, and shows that society often faces trade-o¤s between improving the bureaucracy or improving the performance of politicians. My results characterize the conditions under which meritbased recruitment and civil service protections such as tenure can improve welfare.
Introduction
Laws governing the merit-based selection and compensation of bureaucrats and their protection from political pressure are commonly viewed as a staple of a well-functioning democracy.
Because bureaucrats protected from politics may also be less responsive to legitimate policy directives, the optimal structure of civil service laws is a nontrivial problem of institutional design. As a result, rules governing the operation of bureaucracies have been an active area of institutional reform in the US and around the world. 1 By this measure, the importance of civil service laws rivals that of electoral rules (e.g., districting, campaign …nance) and political decision-making rules (e.g., super-majority requirements, line-item veto powers). But while the latter have been subjected to extensive economic analysis, 2 little is known about the impact of civil service reform.
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of civil service laws. At their core, these laws govern (i) the selection of bureaucrats, typically through competitive examinations, and (ii) the degree of control that politicians can exercise over them, which can be limited through civil service protections such as standardized pay scales and job tenure. While in practice laws have other details, understanding the two core mechanisms of selection and control is an important …rst step towards a better understanding of this institution. In the US federal government, the Pendleton Act of 1883 codi…ed the selection of bureaucrats based on merit (professional quali…cations), and this principle has rarely been questioned since. The desirable level of control has been more controversial, and while the Pendleton Act aimed at reducing control, more recent reforms beginning with the Civil Service Reform Act of 1 Between 1981 and 1991, civil service reforms were a component in 90 World Bank loans to 44 di¤erent countries totalling over $ 4.6 billion (Lindauer and Nunberg, 1996) . Every US president in the 20th century had a government reorganization program with personnel implications near the top of his reform agenda (see OPM (2003) for a history of federal reform proposals). State governments are also active reformers. Contentious legislation in Georgia (1996) , Florida (2001) , and Arizona (2012) ended traditional civil service protections, including tenure, for a substantial number of state employees. In 2011 pay-setting procedures were in the spotlight after a series of states, led by Wisconsin, repealed the collective bargaining rights of public employees. 2 See Besley and Case (2003) for a survey of the literature on the policy e¤ects of electoral and decisionmaking rules in US states.
1978 increased control and reduced bureaucrats'protections. 3 The analysis presented here describes the conditions under which these types of reforms are desirable. It shows that the selection and control of bureaucrats can interact in subtle ways with the electoral process,
a¤ecting not just what bureaucrats do, but also which politicians get elected and the policies they choose once in o¢ ce. In particular, society will often face a trade-o¤ between improving the bureaucracy or improving the performance of politicians.
My results are based on three broad ideas concerning civil service reform. First, civil service rules can interfere with the ability of elections to discipline politicians. This is because bureaucrats a¤ect a politician's payo¤ from holding o¢ ce, and therefore the value of being reelected. If a politician gets lower utility from working with a better bureaucracy, then improving the bureaucracy lowers his value of reelection, and hence his incentive to choose policies that bene…t voters. For example, a "corrupt" mayor may carry out socially bene…cial policies as long as being surrounded by loyal (corrupt) bureaucrats makes reelection worthwhile. Civil service reform can reduce bureaucratic corruption either through better selection (if more honest bureaucrats are hired) or reduced control (if bureaucrats become more honest once they are protected from the mayor). This can lower the mayor's utility from holding o¢ ce, and cause him to abandon the bene…cial policies. The more corrupt the politician (i.e., the more he needs elections to remain honest), the more his incentive to choose good policies is likely to decrease when the bureaucracy improves.
Second, civil service rules can interfere with the ability of elections to screen politicians. This is due to bureaucrats'role in transmitting information between politicians and voters.
Voters need information on the actions of politicians to hold them accountable, but they
rarely observe directly what happens in the legislature or in the White House, much less what happens in a governor's or a mayor's o¢ ce. What they typically see are the actions of bureaucrats, and they judge politicians based on the policies as implemented by these bu-reaucrats. 4 Improving the bureaucracy is likely to make its actions less informative regarding the behavior of politicians. For example, a bureaucrat who always awards procurement contracts to the lowest bidder is less informative to voters than one who awards the contract to the politician's cousin when asked to do so. An honest bureaucrat makes it harder for voters to throw corrupt politicians out of o¢ ce. Thus, improving the bureaucracy can lower the quality of incumbent politicians.
Finally, civil service protections such as tenure remove the alignment between bureaucrats'and politicians'incentives and this can have socially undesirable consequences. Without tenure a bureaucrat who wants to keep his job needs the politician to be reelected, with tenure he does not. A tenure system can result in strategic behavior by the bureaucrat:
when he learns that the politician does not share his preferences, he can lower his reelection chances by implementing bad policies. Thus, tenured bad bureaucrats can sabotage good politicians without having to worry about losing their jobs. 5 Similarly, tenured good bureaucrats have less reason to protest against bad policies that will get a bad politician thrown out of o¢ ce.
I study these ideas in a simple political agency model with voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. 6 In the model, policies are chosen by politicians but implemented by bureaucrats, and bureaucrats can decide not to comply with the politician's choice. Noncompliant bureaucrats may be punished, capturing the politician's degree of control over the bureaucracy. Politicians as well as bureaucrats can have preferences aligned with voters'("good") or misaligned with voters'("bad"). Voters observe implemented policies, attempt to infer the quality of 4 This seems well understood by the mayors interviewed by Tolchin and Tolchin (1971) , who complained that voters hold them responsible for the policies implemented by bureaucrats who have a large degree of discretion. "Adding to their di¢ culties as mayor is the public belief that they do command, causing the shower of blame which inevitably rains on them when services fail to run optimally." (p73). 5 Indeed, politicians often worry that bureaucrats protected by tenure will have electoral costs for them. As Roosevelt "kingmaker"James A. Farley noted: "Some of the greatest troubles the President has had were caused by subordinate o¢ cials who were in sharp disagreement with his policies and, rightly or wrongly, were sabotaging the job he was trying to accomplish." (quoted in White and Smith, 1939, p92) . 6 This model is one of the few existing attempts to understand the "multilayered agency problem between voters, politicians, and bureaucrats which has not been studied extensively in the agency model." (Besley, 2006, p232) both the politician and the bureaucrat, and decide whether to reelect the politician. Section 3 presents the simplest version of the model, where in each period the politician interacts with a bureaucrat randomly chosen from a large bureaucracy. In Section 4 bureaucrats "live" for two periods, engage in forward-looking strategic behavior, and the politician has the option to …re them. Section 5 studies various other extensions.
The results help rationalize various aspects of real-world civil service reforms. I …nd that lowering politicians'control over bureaucrats is bene…cial if politicians'quality is low and elections are ine¤ective at disciplining them, which is in line with the views commonly held by reformers in the Progressive era. My results also explain why it is important to pair reduced control with improved selection that raises the quality of bureaucrats. This provides a rationale for early US reforms emphasizing merit-based recruitment. However, unless the quality of bureaucrats can be improved substantially, improving the bureaucracy can lead to lower welfare because this makes it harder for voters to discipline and screen bad politicians. When the quality of bureaucrats is low, giving politicians more control can raise welfare, in line with provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act and other recent reforms aimed at increasing the responsiveness of the bureaucracy. Interestingly, I …nd that increasing political control can increase welfare even if politicians are worse than bureaucrats.
More generally, my …ndings suggest that traditional civil service rules emphasizing reduced control and improved bureaucratic selection may be a useful substitute for, but not a good complement to well-functioning democratic elections.
In this model, tenure makes both bad and good bureaucrats less likely to implement good policies. The latter happens because a bad policy reveals to voters that the incumbent politician is bad, and a tenured bureaucrat can thus get the politician replaced while keeping his job. In the short run, any welfare gains from bureaucrats' tenure can only come from improving the performance of politicians. Alternatively, tenure can raise welfare when the long-run gains from an improved bureaucracy o¤set the short run welfare losses from worse bureaucratic performance. My results provide a rationale for putting top-level bureaucratic positions that o¤er more possibilities for strategic behavior outside the scope of civil service protections, as is done in many civil service systems. The results also suggest that pairing tenure with provisions to support whistle-blowers can be important. This may allow a bureaucrat to reveal a bad politician's type to voters without implementing bad policies.
Related literature
Most of the existing literature directly addressing theoretical considerations related to civil service reform is informal (see P…¤ner and Brook (2000) for an overview). 7 In particular, I know of no formal analysis of the welfare e¤ects of civil service rules. Indirectly, the most relevant literature is that on bureaucracies, which remains small compared to the . These studies deal with the normative question of whether a decision maker should be elected (a politician), or appointed (a bureaucrat or a judge). Like them, my focus is normative, but I take it as given that the policy-making process involves both elected and non-elected decision makers. One question I study is how regulating the interaction between these two types of decision makers a¤ects voters'ability to hold politicians accountable. While the existing literature seems most relevant in the case of high-level decision makers (e.g., whether the head of a federal agency or a city should be elected or appointed), I focus on the relationship between a politician and lower level bureaucrats who are typically the subject of civil service regulations.
In political science, studies on delegation usually take a positive (as opposed to normative) approach and ask about the conditions under which a politician will choose to delegate some 7 A handful of empirical studies exist on civil service systems in speci…c settings, including municipal reforms in the Progressive era (Rauch, 1995) , merit selection of US judges (Hanssen, 2004) , the tenure system of English judges (Blanes i Vidal and Leaver, 2011), and merit systems in US states (Folke et al., 2011 , Ujhelyi, 2014 A second strand of the literature on bureaucracies, including Besley and McLaren (1993) and Prendergast (2007) , has studied the selection of bureaucrats with the right preferences.
These models do not have elected politicians, but instead focus on the relationship between bureaucrats and their clients. In particular, Prendergast (2007) shows that in some cases it is bene…cial to have a bureaucrat who has di¤erent preferences from that of his clients.
A necessary (but, interestingly, not su¢ cient) condition for this is that clients'preferences be the opposite of society's. By explicitly modeling the electoral process, my paper o¤ers a complementary perspective. Here, it may in fact be bene…cial to have bureaucrats whose preferences are misaligned with society's, because this may improve the ability of elections to discipline or screen politicians.
Since civil service rules are the alternative to a patronage system, this paper also relates naturally to studies of political patronage (see Ujhelyi and Calvo (2013) and the references therein). While civil service reform is often advocated by simply referring to the disad- 8 For example, Patty (2007, 2013) present a model in which a politician delegates authority in order to give bureaucrats an incentive to invest in expertise. By contrast, in Fox and Jordan (2011) a bad politician delegates in order to shift the blame for bad policies onto the bureaucrat, and avoid being punished by voters. Johnson and Libecap (1994) discuss US civil service in the federal government as being motivated by politicians'increasing transaction costs from patronage. 9 That most politicians view civil service rules as constraints is supported by extensive descriptive evidence (e.g., Tolchin and Tolchin, 1971) , by empirical evidence showing that these rules limit politicians' ability to distribute patronage (Folke et al., 2011 , Ujhelyi, 2014 , and by the fact that once introduced, they are di¢ cult to reverse and tend to change infrequently (Ting et al., 2013 , Ujhelyi, 2014 . vantages of patronage, this paper may contribute to a more balanced evaluation of these alternatives.
Finally, this paper belongs more broadly to the political agency literature concerned with the ability of elections to resolve informational problems in politics. 10 There has been growing interest in understanding whether this role of elections could be a¤ected by institutional features such as term limits (Besley and Case, 1995, Smart and Sturm, 2013) , separation of powers (Persson et al., 1997) , or …scal restraints (Besley and Smart, 2007 ). The present paper shows how civil service rules interact with the disciplining or screening of politicians in the electoral process.
The benchmark model
In this section, I set up the benchmark model, describe the equilibrium, and analyze the e¤ect of civil service reforms that change politicians' control or improve the selection of bureaucrats. All proofs for this section are in the Appendix.
Setup
There are two periods, with an election held between the two. In both periods, an incumbent politician chooses a policy E 2 f0; 1g: The policy is implemented by a bureaucrat who has discretion in shaping the implementation process. The policy actually implemented may therefore be di¤erent from the one chosen by the politician: let e 2 f0; 1g denote the implemented policy (throughout, I use lower case variables to distinguish bureaucrats from politicians). If e = E, the bureaucrat complies with the policy chosen by the politician.
Here, "policies"are construed broadly and can include formal directives as well as informal requests. For example, a politician may specify the criteria for delivering low-income subsidies, and a social worker may decide whether or not to follow these criteria in distributing checks. Or a politician may ask a bureaucrat to favor a particular contractor in a procurement tender, and the bureaucrat may favor that contractor or not. Lipsky (1980) Whether policy 0 or 1 is more desirable to voters depends on the state of the world S 2 f0; 1g: Both states have equal probability and are realized independently in each period.
Voters derive utility from the implemented policy according to the function
where > 0, and I will therefore refer to policies equal to S as "good"policies, while policies equal to 1 S are "bad". All players discount period-2 payo¤s by a factor .
The politician can be of two types, Good or Bad. Good politicians derive the same payo¤ from implemented policies as the voters do: V GP (e; S) U (e; S). Bad politicians prefer bad policies, perhaps because they are supported by some special interest who does not share the preferences of voters. Speci…cally, a bad politician's payo¤ from the policy implemented by the bureaucrat is
where R, the bad politician's rent from the implementation of his favorite policy, is drawn from a distribution on [0; 1) with cdf G(:) and mean R: Politicians may also derive a payo¤ from the act of choosing a policy (or, equivalently, may dislike it when a bureaucrat does not comply with their choice). I capture this by letting politicians'payo¤ be V (E; e; S) = V (e; S)
if e = E but V (E; e; S) = V (e; S) if e 6 = E, where 2 (0; 1) is a constant. Lower values of imply a larger disutility from noncompliance by the bureaucrat. 11 Politicians also receive a …xed bene…t V 0 from holding o¢ ce, and the probability that a politician is good is .
Bureaucrats' objectives may di¤er from politicians'. The literature has modeled this by assuming either that bureaucrats have their own preferences regarding policies (e.g., payo¤ from a good policy: r < . I discuss relaxing this assumption in Section 5.2.
A bureaucrat who does not comply with the politician's policy choice may be punished:
choosing a policy e 6 = E has a cost h, such as a reduction in pay. In the benchmark model, the parameter h will provide a tractable way to capture the politician's degree of control = 1 and assume that politicians break ties based on V (e; S). This would change Lemma 1 below without a¤ecting any of the subsequent results. 12 One could allow r to be a random variable without changing the analysis of the benchmark model. Results that depend on the magnitude of r relative to other parameters would then hold with some probability. over bureaucrats. 13 The probability of a good bureaucrat is , and I start by assuming that the bureaucrat's type is realized independently in each period. This may capture a situation where the speci…c bureaucrat charged with policy implementation is drawn randomly from the bureaucracy, so that the politician only interacts with any one bureaucrat over a short horizon. I relax this assumption and consider forward-looking bureaucrats in Section 4.
14 The timing is as follows. At the start of period 1, the politician and the bureaucrat learn their type and the state S 1 . A bad politician also learns the rent R 1 . The politician chooses a policy E 1 for the …rst period. The bureaucrat implements a policy e 1 . The implemented policy is observed publicly, and …rst-period payo¤s are realized. Voters decide whether or not to reelect the politician. If they do not reelect, a new politician is chosen randomly. At the start of period 2, the state S 2 , the rent R 2 and the bureaucrat's type are realized. The politician in o¢ ce chooses a policy E 2 , the bureaucrat implements a policy e 2 , payo¤s are realized and the game ends. 
Equilibrium
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Since there are no strategic considerations in period 2, the equilibrium is fully characterized by period-1 strategies. It consists of policy choices for each type of politician, policies implemented by each type of bureaucrat (conditional on the politician's choice), voter beliefs about the politician's type, and reelection decisions by voters given the observed policy. In equilibrium, strategies are best responses to each-other given voters' beliefs, and these beliefs are formed rationally given the strategies.
Given our assumptions on the bureaucrat's payo¤s, a good (bad) bureaucrat always complies with good (bad) policies chosen by the politician. In addition, each type complies with policies he doesn't like when the punishment is su¢ ciently large. Thus, if a politician chooses policy E in state S, the probability that the policy will be implemented if it is good is Pr(e = EjS;
while the probability that it will be implemented if it is bad is
where I is an indicator equal to 1 if the condition in its subscript is true and 0 otherwise.
These expressions give the probability of compliance with good or bad policies, respectively.
The following Proposition describes the equilibrium that I will focus on in the rest of the analysis. In the Online Appendix, I show that other equilibria either generate the same outcomes of interest, or they are not robust to a slight perturbation similar to Maskin and Tirole (2004) .
Proposition 1
The following is part of an equilibrium. In period 1, good politicians choose good policies, and bad politicians choose good policies if
Voters reelect the politician if and only if the policy implemented by the bureaucrat is good.
In period 2, politicians always choose their preferred policy.
In Proposition 1, rational voters reelect a politician when they see that the policy implemented by the bureaucrat is good. When (4) holds, a bad politician "exercises discipline":
he chooses a good policy in order to get reelected. In equilibrium, this happens with proba-
): Discipline is more likely if the expected period-2 rent ( R) or the value of holding o¢ ce (V 0 ) is large, if the politician is more patient (larger ), or if the rent from getting a bad policy implemented when a good policy was chosen is larger (larger ). Most importantly, discipline is increasing in G and B :
Lemma 1 Increased compliance with good or bad policies makes the politician more likely to exercise discipline.
Lemma 1 together with Lemma 2 below are the keys to understanding the e¤ects of civil service reform in the benchmark model. That compliance with a good policy makes this policy more attractive to the politician is natural since noncompliance is costly. But why does compliance with a bad policy improve discipline? This is because if reelected, a bad politician will choose such a policy in period 2 with probability one. If bureaucrats are more willing to comply with a bad policy tomorrow, this increases a bad politician's incentive to get reelected by choosing a good policy today. This suggests that in some cases there will be a trade-o¤ between improving bureaucrats'and politicians'performance.
Making bureaucrats less compliant with bad policies can reduce the e¤ectiveness of elections in disciplining politicians.
16 16 This insight does not depend on there being a last period, as I show in Section 5.4 where I consider an While the period-1 policy choices re ‡ect discipline (or lack thereof), the period-2 policy choice shows the quality of politicians emerging from the electoral process. Our second key lemma states that more compliant bureaucrats lead to the election of better politicians.
Lemma 2 Holding discipline ( ) constant, increased compliance with good or bad policies improves the quality of politicians.
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This Lemma is the key to understanding how civil service reform interacts with the screening role of elections. Increased compliance means that the policy implemented by the bureaucrat is more informative regarding the policy chosen by the politician, and hence his type. Increased compliance with a good policy helps voters reelect good politicians, while increased compliance with a bad policy helps throw bad politicians out of o¢ ce. This suggests that in some cases there will be a trade-o¤ between improving bureaucrats'performance and politicians' quality. Making bureaucrats less compliant with bad policies can reduce the e¤ectiveness of elections in screening politicians.
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I now use these results to study how civil service reform a¤ects policy choices and voter welfare. As Lemmas 1 and 2 suggest, any direct e¤ects have to be weighed against the impact on policy making through bureaucrats'compliance.
The welfare e¤ects of bureaucrats'selection and control
Civil service reform often aims to improve bureaucrats'quality through entrance examinations and other quali…cation requirements. In the US, merit-based recruitment was introduced into the federal bureaucracy by the Pendleton Act of 1883, and lower-level governments gradually followed. In the model, the quality of the bureaucracy is captured by the extension to an in…nite horizon. What it depends on is the existence of future rents that can be obtained if the politician is reelected. 17 As is common in political agency models, better discipline mechanically leads to less screening, as it implies that bad politicians are less likely to be revealed. By holding constant, Lemma 2 focuses on the e¤ects that do not follow mechanically from Lemma 1. 18 Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 do not rely on a speci…c model of bureaucrat behavior. These results hold as long as bureaucrats can have some discretion, so that G and B are not always 1, regardless of where G and B come from. For example, this will also be true if bureaucrats have career concerns. I explore this extension in more detail in Section 5.3.
probability that a bureaucrat's preferences are aligned with voters'. For example, civil service exams might be designed to select bureaucrats who are more likely to share society's preferences. Another important component of civil service laws is the degree of control they give politicians over bureaucrats, or the degree to which bureaucrats are "insulated" from politics. Control can be limited by …xed pay-scales and seniority-based promotions, tenure, and a prohibition on bureaucrats' performing political services. While the Pendleton Act reduced control, recent reforms starting with the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act sought to make bureaucrats more responsive by increasing control. In this benchmark model, the degree of control is captured by the size of the punishment h that the bureaucrat faces for not complying with the policy chosen by the politician. We can distinguish three regimes: full control over both good and bad bureaucrats ( < h), selective control over bad but not over good bureaucrats (r < h < ), and no control over either type of bureaucrat (h < r).
The question I ask here is: if society decides to engage in civil service reform that changes h or , how will this a¤ect the quality of politicians in o¢ ce, the policies they choose, and voter welfare?
Not surprisingly, the …rst best can be achieved by a civil service reform that eliminates full control and simultaneously ensures that only good bureaucrats are hired. This follows immediately from (2) and (3): h < and = 1 yield B = 0 and G = 1, so that bureaucrats always implement good policies and the incumbent politician's type becomes irrelevant. Of course, such perfect reform is seldom feasible, just like it is generally not possible to replace politicians with bureaucrats (at least in the contexts where the question of optimal civil service rules arises).
Propositions 2 and 3 below describe the e¤ects of changing control and selection on politicians'choices, the quality of politicians emerging from the electoral process, and voter welfare. 19 The Online Appendix provides numerical examples.
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Proposition 2 (i) Reducing the politician's control over bureaucrats makes the politician less likely to choose a good policy in period 1.
(ii) No control always leads to worse period-2 politicians than selective or full control. Selective control leads to worse politicians than full control i¤
(iii) In terms of voter welfare, selective control always dominates no control. Full control dominates selective control i¤
Part (iii) of the proposition shows that removing the politician's control over bureaucrats can reduce welfare even if it is done selectively (so that the politician retains control over bad bureaucrats). Parts (i) and (ii) describe the mechanism behind this …nding. Of course conditional on the policy chosen by the politician less control over good bureaucrats improves welfare. However, changing control will also a¤ect politicians'choices Part (i) of the Proposition shows that giving politicians less control always results in worse policy choices in period 1. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 1: less control means that the bureaucrat will be less likely to comply with the politician's choice and this lowers the politician's incentive to get reelected by choosing a good policy. Thus, we have a trade-o¤ between bureaucrats' and politicians' performance. This can o¤set the direct bene…t of reduced control and lead to lower welfare. To see how the parameters of the model a¤ect this tradeo¤, set voter's discount factor to 0, so that only period-1 welfare matters.
Part (iii) then implies that giving the politician more control is desirable when the quality of the bureaucracy ( ) is low or the quality of politicians ( ) is high. 21 However, more 19 Although in this model politicians'choices have no social value of their own, in reality they may have long-term consequences beyond their e¤ect on the current policies that bureaucrats implement. For example, they may a¤ect voters' payo¤s far in the future, or they may create constraints for future policy-making. Similarly, having higher quality politicians in o¢ ce might have other bene…ts than the ones modeled here. 20 As the proofs make clear, statements like "increase" should be read as "increase or stay constant" (i.e., weakly increase). I chose to drop the quali…er in the interest of readability. 21 In this case, in part (iii), full control dominates selective control i¤ > and it dominates no control i¤
control can be desirable even if politicians are worse than bureaucrats ( << ) because the politicians'incentive can compensate for their lower quality. Giving a low-politician some control is desirable if the politician is patient (high ), or if the value of holding o¢ ce (V 0 ) or the expected rent ( R) is large. The worse the politician is on average (the larger average rent he gets from a bad policy), the more he needs incentives to act in voters'interest, therefore the more likely it is that giving him control will raise period-1 welfare.
Changes in the politician's period-1 choice naturally a¤ect the quality of the politician emerging from the electoral process in period 2. For example, if bad politicians always exercise discipline, they will be reelected, and the screening role of elections disappears. However, civil service reform also a¤ects directly voters'ability to screen politicians. This is because bureaucrats a¤ect the amount of information that voters gain about the incumbent politician (Lemma 2). Even if bad politicians do not exercise discipline, they will be reelected if good bureaucrats do not comply with their bad policy choices. Part (ii) of the proposition describes the impact of changing control on the screening of politicians. No control results in the worst expected quality of period-2 politicians. In this case, the period-1 policy implemented is determined entirely by the bureaucrat's type and therefore conveys no information regarding the politician. As control is increased, the implemented policy becomes more informative regarding the politician's choice, allowing more screening. However, the e¤ect on the politician's expected quality need not be monotonic. Full control can yield worse politicians than selective control because the bad politician is more likely to choose a good policy (part (i)), and hence less likely to be revealed. This can o¤set the increased ‡ow of information resulting from more control. 22 The welfare calculation of changing control needs to balance these indirect e¤ects on voters' ability to incentivize and screen politicians with the direct e¤ect on bureaucrats'
performance. Compared to no control, selective control represents an improvement in all dimensions (bureaucratic performance, discipline, politicians' quality) and therefore yields higher welfare. Full control, however, can have positive as well as negative welfare e¤ects. It lowers bureaucratic performance by forcing good bureaucrats to comply with bad policies, but it improves politicians'discipline, and also has the potential to improve electoral screening. Full control tends to be more desirable than no control when is low, is large, or when the discipline G[ ( R + V 0 )] it creates is large.
Like changing control, changing the selection of bureaucrats ( ), also a¤ects the interaction of voters and politicians. The welfare e¤ects of improved bureaucrat quality are thus determined by these indirect e¤ects together with the direct e¤ects on bureaucratic performance. As the following proposition shows, better bureaucrats can lead to worse politicians and worse policies.
Proposition 3 Improving the quality of bureaucrats ( ):
(i) makes the politician less likely to choose a good policy in period 1;
(ii) lowers the quality of the period-2 politician when h 2 (r; ) and
; and increases it otherwise;
(iii) lowers voter welfare when h 2 (r; ) and R(1 )
(1 )); and increases it otherwise;
Part (i) of the Proposition shows that improving the quality of bureaucrats always leads to worse period-1 behavior by the politician. This is because better bureaucrats have lower compliance with bad policies and this reduces politicians'incentives for reelection (Lemma 1).
Thus, we have a trade-o¤ between bureaucrats'quality and politicians'performance. This can result in an improved bureaucracy implementing worse policies, and hence a reduction in welfare. A better bureaucracy leading to lower welfare tends to be more likely if the initial quality of bureaucrats ( ) is low, or if the politician's discount factor ( ), value of holding o¢ ce (V 0 ), or expected rent ( R) is large. 23 This suggests, for example, that a reform that improves bureaucrat selection may have to raise substantially in order to be bene…cial. 23 When voters'discount factor is 0, the condition in part (iii) becomes R(1 ) > . Note that is the Mills ratio of the distribution G, which for common distributions (including normal, uniform, or exponential) is nonincreasing. In these cases, the two sides of the inequality move in opposite directions.
Part (ii) of the proposition highlights the possibility of a trade-o¤ between the quality of bureaucrats and the quality of politicians emerging from the electoral process. When h 2 (r; ); improving the quality of bureaucrats ( ) means that bad policies are less likely to be complied with, and voters are therefore more likely to reelect a bad politician. When there is no discipline (G 0), this trade-o¤ always results in worse quality politicians. In other cases, increasing also lowers discipline (part (i)), which tends to improve screening.
The condition in the proposition determines when the total e¤ect on screening is negative.
Overall, the welfare e¤ects of improved bureaucrat quality are determined by the direct e¤ect of on the policy implemented as well as its e¤ects on politicians'behavior and their screening in the electoral process. Improving the bureaucracy tends to be more desirable when bureaucrats'quality is already high, politicians'discipline G is low, or when voters are more patient.
Discussion
Propositions 2 and 3 may help rationalize certain aspects of real-world civil service reforms.
Recent US reforms aimed at increasing political control over bureaucrats by weakening or removing civil service protections may be optimal if society believes that the majority of incumbent bureaucrats are bad ( is low). Indeed, this is one reading of common complaints regarding ine¢ cient bureaucracies and red tape. 24 In this case, Proposition 2(i) implies that increasing control will raise welfare by giving politicians an incentive to choose better policies. Since removing control is more desirable when is large, this rationalizes why early civil service reforms, which aimed at lowering politicians'control over bureaucrats, put great emphasis on simultaneously improving bureaucratic selection. Interestingly, the model predicts that reforms that improve the quality of bureaucrats will typically be accompanied 24 Characteristics that "many Americans associate with the word bureaucracy: ‡abby, overpaid, and lazy; unimaginative; a demanding leviathan; slow to abandon unsuccessful policies and accept new ideas; arrogant, smug, and condescending; impersonal; red-tape artists..." (Ingraham, 1995, ix) . Note that unresponsive bureaucracies alone cannot provide a full explanation for these reforms, since unresponsiveness is socially optimal if politicians have a high probability of choosing bad policies.
by politicians'choices becoming worse (Proposition 3(i) ).
More generally, the above results show that civil service reform a¤ects the ability of elections to discipline and screen politicians. Reforms that insulate the bureaucracy from politicians may also insulate politicians from voters. One implication is that the case for civil service reform is much more clear-cut when the electoral system is ine¤ective at serving these disciplining and screening functions to begin with. If politicians always choose their preferred policies and good or bad politicians are equally likely to be reelected, then improving bureaucratic selection and lowering control over good bureaucrats is always desirable. In this case, the trade-o¤s with politicians'behavior or quality are avoided. To the extent that democratic elections today are more e¤ective than 100 years ago, these observations can shed light on the di¤erent focus of early and later civil service reforms. Indeed, Progressive era reformers emphasized the improved selection of bureaucrats and reduced control in a period when "Civil service systems, or merit systems, were equated with "good"government. They represented fair and equitable examinations, quali…ed public servants, and a commitment to the higher ideals of the state. Politics, on the other hand, had come to represent what was wrong with government." (Ingraham, 1995, 25) . In this sense, a bureaucracy with strong civil service protections may have served as a substitute to e¤ective democratic elections.
However, it may not be a good complement to such elections, as the more recent reforms suggest.
Strategic bureaucrats and tenure
Above, I have assumed that in every period a new bureaucrat is chosen and asked to implement the policy. In reality, bureaucrats may interact with the politician over multiple periods, and in fact an important consideration of civil service systems is whether they can be …red. A longer time horizon implies that bureaucrats'actions may be a¤ected by a desire to keep their job. Furthermore, bureaucrats may strategically in ‡uence the reelection chances of the incumbent politician through the policies they implement.
In this section I extend the model to take these considerations into account. I use the model to study the e¤ect of limiting politicians' control through bureaucratic tenure.
Speci…cally, I compare a situation where the bureaucrat can lose his job after period 1 if he gets …red by the politician or if the politician is not reelected (untenured case), to one where he always keeps his job in both periods (tenured case). 25 The details of the analysis are in the Online Appendix.
Setup and equilibrium
The sequence of events is now as follows. At the start of period 1, the politician and the bureaucrat learn their type and the state S 1 . A bad politician learns the rent R 1 , and the politician chooses a policy E 1 for the …rst period. The bureaucrat sees E 1 , forms a belief about the politician's type, and implements a policy e 1 . The politician sees e 1 , forms a belief about the bureaucrat's type, and, in the nontenured system, decides whether to …re the bureaucrat. 26 The implemented policy is observed publicly, and …rst-period payo¤s are realized. Voters form a belief about the politician's type and the bureaucrat's type based on e 1 (they do not observe whether the bureaucrat was …red), and decide whether or not to reelect the politician. If they do not reelect, a new politician and, if the …rst bureaucrat was …red, a new bureaucrat are chosen randomly at the start of period 2. The state S 2 and the rent R 2 are realized, policies E 2 and e 2 are chosen and the game ends.
Solving these models (the tenured and the untenured version) requires keeping track of all players' beliefs regarding both politicians and bureaucrats. Strategic bureaucrats may now have di¤erent propensity to comply with speci…c policies in periods 1 and 2. This is because the bureaucrat's decision can have implications for whether or not he keeps his job in period 2, and because the politician's choice may reveal his type to the bureaucrat, who can decide whether to facilitate the politician's reelection. Voters decide whether or not to reelect the incumbent politician based on the probability of obtaining a good policy in period 2, which can now depend on updated beliefs regarding both the incumbent politician and the incumbent bureaucrat. As in the benchmark case, good politicians choose good policies, and bad politicians choose bad policies if the rent is large enough, although the cuto¤ can di¤er from the benchmark case. Good (bad) bureaucrats always comply with good (bad) policies, and they comply with the other policy if the punishment is large enough. Voters reelect after a good implemented policy and do not reelect after a bad one.
The e¤ect of tenure
To simplify the notation, let q[x] 1 + (
1), where q > 1 and q 0 < 0 for x 2 [0; 1). We then have the following result:
Proposition 4 (i) When introducing tenure a¤ects the period-1 behavior of bureaucrats, it causes bad bureaucrats to stop complying with good policies and / or good bureaucrats to start complying with bad ones.
(ii) Tenure can only raise period-1 welfare when it improves the politician's choice and has no e¤ect on bureaucrats. Speci…cally, when rq[ ( R + V 0 )] < h < 1+ ; introducing tenure can make politicians more likely to choose a good policy and can raise welfare. In all other cases, tenure can only lead to lower welfare.
(iii) Tenure raises the present value of voter welfare when period-1 welfare increases, and
. In all other cases, tenure can only lead to lower welfare.
Part (i) of the proposition describes the e¤ect of tenure on bureaucrats'behavior. Good bureaucrats become more willing to comply with bad policies because this can lead to the replacement of a politician who has revealed himself to be bad without jeopardizing the bureaucrat's job. 27 At the same time, bad bureaucrats become less likely to comply with good policies. This is both because a bad policy no longer gets the bureaucrat replaced, and because a good policy choice is more likely to come from a good incumbent, and therefore the bureaucrat gains by having him replaced by a random politician in period 2. Thus, compared to untenured bureaucrats, tenured bureaucrats are more likely to comply with bad policies and less likely to comply with good ones. In this sense, we should expect bureaucracies with tenure to perform worse than those without tenure, holding the politician's choice constant.
The politician's response to the bureaucrats' increased willingness to comply with bad policies is typically a higher likelihood of choosing a bad policy. This leads to worse policies being implemented and lower welfare in period 1 (Proposition 4 (ii)). It is only when tenure improves the politician's behavior and has no impact on bureaucrats that tenure can raise welfare. When the condition in part (ii) holds, bad bureaucrats comply with any policy while good bureaucrats always implement a good policy both with and without tenure. This means that a bad politician can learn the bureaucrat's type by choosing a bad policy, allowing him to …re a good bureaucrat in the untenured case. Tenure takes away this possibility and thus makes the bad policy less attractive. The politician becomes more likely to choose a good policy and welfare increases.
The e¤ect of tenure on the present value of voter welfare is given in part (iii) of Proposition 4. Since tenure cannot improve the period 1 behavior of bureaucrats, its value can only come from either the improved performance of politicians raising period 1 welfare, or from improved policies in period 2. The present value of voter welfare increases when …rst-period welfare increases. In addition, the present value of welfare can increase also if r < h < min( 1+ ; rq[ (R + V 0 )], provided that the fraction of good bureaucrats is su¢ ciently large. 28 In this case bad politicians'discipline becomes 0 leading to lower welfare in period 1, but good bureaucrats are no longer …red, and when is large, the resulting gain in period 2 can o¤set the loss of utility in period 1. In all other cases, introducing tenure can only lower the present value of welfare.
Discussion
One implication of the above results is that a tenure system for bureaucrats can have undesirable consequences when bureaucrats act strategically and understand that their actions can a¤ect a politician's reelection. As we saw, tenure can only make the performance of such bureaucrats worse. Since in practice strategic behavior is more likely to be relevant for high-level bureaucrats, this supports putting these positions outside of the tenure system.
Indeed, most real-world systems designate several top-level positions as being "political",
i.e., appointed by whoever is in power without the constraints imposed by civil service regulations. The common view is that this ensures that politicians can choose top bureaucrats who share their preferences, but Wilson (1989, p198) points out that in practice the appointing politician (e.g., the president appointing an agency head) has very little idea of the preferences of his appointee on speci…c policy questions (some of which may only arise in the future). This model suggests an alternative explanation: the lack of tenure in these positions ensures that top bureaucrats are disciplined by the same electoral incentives as their appointers. This raises welfare by lowering their incentive to implement bad policies in order to undermine the politician. 29 Alternatively, the negative implications of tenure can be mitigated if bureaucrats have other means of communicating with voters besides the policies they implement. Whistleblower rules that encourage public employees to reveal information about the policy-making 28 In the second condition in Part (iii) of Proposition 4,1 is decreasing in . 29 Concern over such "sabotage" by tenured bureaucrats led one Reagan administration o¢ cial to recommend that career bureaucrats be kept in the dark regarding the objectives of speci…c policies and how the pieces of the policy puzzle …t together. This "jigsaw puzzle management" was thought to minimize bureaucrats'incentive to distort policy implementation (Ingraham, 1995, pp100-101) . process might serve this purpose. For example, the Civil Service Reform Act created the O¢ ce of Special Counsel speci…cally to protect whistle-blowers (Ingraham, 1995) . In the model, this could allow a good bureaucrat to reveal a bad politician's type without having to implement a bad policy. The above results suggest that pairing bureaucratic tenure with whistle-blower rules may be particularly useful. 30 Finally, the above results also have implications for understanding the workings of a system of political patronage. Two features commonly associated with patronage are that it represents some form of vote buying (employment in exchange for political support), and that employees can be …red at any time. 31 In the above model, the ability to …re bureaucrats does indeed give incumbents an electoral advantage. An immediate consequence of Proposition 4(i) is that when bureaucrats do not have tenure, politicians are more likely to be reelected.
However, this result does not rely on any direct vote buying by politicians. Instead, the absence of tenure automatically aligns bureaucrats and politicians'incentives. Bureaucrats without job security will be more likely to implement policies that get a politician reelected.
In this sense, explicit vote buying may not be a crucial feature of the patronage relationship.
Other extensions
This section discusses various other extensions to the benchmark model. For each of these the Online Appendix contains further details.
Politician' s choice can be observed
Suppose that, after the politician chooses E, the voter observes this with some probability p. This does not a¤ect bureaucrats'behavior in the benchmark model. The politician will be reelected if either the voter observes that E = S, or if he does not observe E but observes that e = S. Good politicians continue choosing good policies, while the condition given in 30 See Ting (2008) for an analysis of whistle-blowing in a di¤erent model. 31 Clearly, patronage systems have other relevant features which my model is not suited to study.
(4) for a bad politician to choose a good policy now becomes
Not surprisingly, the larger the probability p that his choices will be observed, the more likely the politician is to exercise discipline.
How does p > 0 change the impact of civil service reform? It is easy to see that p does not a¤ect the impact of reform in period 1 because it does not a¤ect politicians'incentive to exercise discipline. Intuitively, these e¤ects operate through future payo¤s that are contingent on reelection. The parameter p only a¤ects the probability of reelection, and it does not a¤ect these payo¤s. In particular, less control or better bureaucrats lead to worse period-1 behavior by the politician even if p > 0 (part (i) of Propositions 2 and 3).
The possibility of observing politicians' choices directly does change the bureaucrats' impact on voters'ability to screen politicians. This is natural: if p = 1, so that politicians' choices are always observed, the bureaucrat's policy implementation is irrelevant for voters' beliefs regarding the politician. In this case, civil service reform does not a¤ect screening directly (only indirectly, through ). Thus, while similar results to those in Proposition 2 and 3 parts (ii) and (iii) can be stated, the formal conditions will be di¤erent. In particular, the larger is p, the less likely that civil service reform will interfere with voters' ability to screen politicians. Hence, improved selection (higher ) or reduced control (lower h) will tend to be more desirable when voters are more likely to directly observe politicians'choices.
Perverse control
The model above assumed that r < : bad bureaucrats'payo¤ from their favorite policy is less than good bureaucrats'payo¤ from their favorite. The role of this assumption was to create the possibility of "selective control,"where the politician has control over bad but not over good bureaucrats (r < h < ). This is clearly a desirable regime. By contrast, if < r, then selective control is replaced by "perverse control,"where the politician has control over good but not over bad bureaucrats ( < h < r). This could be a relevant possibility, e.g., in
some rentier states where a bureaucrat's pecuniary bene…ts from choosing bad policies could be particularly large.
In the benchmark model, perverse control always yields lower welfare than no control.
While no control requires a good bureaucrat for a good policy to be implemented, perverse control requires both a good bureaucrat and a good policy choice by the politician. In this case, lowering politicians'control might be particularly desirable.
When < h < r, improving bureaucrat selection ( ) always raises welfare. The direct e¤ect is clear: a better bureaucracy means that good politicians'choices are more likely to be complied with. Interestingly, this can be reinforced by two "multiplier" e¤ects. First, increased compliance with good policies makes these policies more attractive to bad politicians, which improves discipline. Second, increased compliance with good policies means that good politicians are more likely to be reelected, which improves screening.
Overall, when bad bureaucrats are "very bad" ( < r), the case for less control and improved selection is reinforced.
Career concerns
In this section I extend the benchmark model to include bureaucrats with career concerns, and describe the e¤ects of civil service reform in this setting. The setup is the same as in belief that the bureaucrat is good given the implemented policy.
The bureaucrats'probability of compliance G and B now has to be derived as part of the equilibrium. This yields
Just like in the benchmark model, a su¢ ciently high h can guarantee compliance with any policy. However, for h 2 ( ; + m), there is another equilibrium where good bureaucrats only implement good policies because the market value of their reputation is enough to compensate them for any punishment. Similarly, the value of reputation leads bad bureaucrats to comply with good policies even for h 2 (r m; r).
Results equivalent to Proposition 2 and 3 can now be established exactly as in Appendix
A by simply replacing the three parameter ranges ( < h; h 2 (r; ), h < r) with the corresponding ranges in (5). Proposition 2 holds exactly as written, where full, selective and no control now refers to the new parameter ranges in (5). Proposition 3 holds replacing the h 2 (r; ) condition with h 2 (jr mj; + m): Note that while in the benchmark model changing never had an impact on welfare for h > , this is no longer the case in one of the equilibria when h 2 ( ; + m). In this sense, the e¤ects described in Proposition 3 appear for a larger set of parameters when bureaucrats have career concerns.
In…nite horizon
In this section I analyze how civil service reform a¤ects the ability of elections to discipline or screen politicians when there are many periods. I show that the trade-o¤ between better bureaucrats and better political performance can also arise in this case. This extends the results in Proposition 3 to an in…nite horizon model.
The setup is as in Section 3, but there is an election after each period and the politician stays in o¢ ce for as many period as he is reelected. I …rst consider an equilibrium with the following (Markov) strategies. Voters reelect after each period where the incumbent chose a good policy and do not reelect otherwise. The bad politician uses a cuto¤ strategy where he chooses the good policy whenever the realized rent in period t, R t , is smaller than a cuto¤ value R , and he chooses the bad policy otherwise. In this case, the continuation value V (R )
tomorrow of a bad politician reelected today satis…es
For h 2 (r; ), this can be used to obtain the equilibrium cuto¤
One may check that the right-hand side of this expression is increasing in R , whereas its derivative w.r.t. is proportional to
For small enough V 0 , this is negative, implying that @R @ < 0. When the quality of bureaucrats is higher, the politician is less likely to exercise discipline, as in Proposition 3(i). Intuitively, when V 0 is low, the incentive for discipline comes from the possibility of getting a higher rent in the future if a bigger draw R t arrives and a bad policy is implemented. However, compliance with a bad policy is less likely when is larger, lowering the incentive for discipline.
To see the e¤ect on screening (as in Proposition 3(ii)) consider the case of = 0 so that a bad politician never chooses a good policy (this is the case, e.g., when is close to 0), and assume h 2 (r; ). Denoting t the probability that a politician in o¢ ce in period t is good,
; where the second term comes from a bad politician who is thrown out of o¢ ce and replaced by a good politician. Since 1 = , some algebra
; which is decreasing in . In this case, improving the quality of bureaucrats lowers the probability of a good politician being in o¢ ce in every period t. As in Proposition 3(ii), this is because a higher makes it more likely that a bad politician is reelected in spite of his chosen policy. 32 The Online Appendix describes some of the welfare e¤ects of reform in this in…nite horizon model.
Conclusion
Political patronage is widely perceived to be a socially costly system to organize a bureaucracy -indeed, it was concern about these costs that gave rise to the …rst wave of US civil service reforms in the Progressive era. However, very little is known about the costs and bene…ts of the alternative to patronage: a civil service system. This paper has presented a welfare analysis of civil service reform in a democracy. I focused on the e¤ects of improving the quality of bureaucrats and of changing the degree of control that politicians have over them, including whether bureaucrats can be …red. In the US, these features of the civil service system have been at the center of policy debates at least since the Pendleton Act.
In thinking about optimal civil service rules, a natural starting point is that politicians should have less in ‡uence over bureaucrats when bureaucrats are likely to be good and politicians bad. However, this intuition ignores the endogeneity of politicians'quality and actions in an electoral system. In my model, more compliant bureaucrats give politicians more incentive to choose good policies and transmit more information to voters about the politicians' type. When civil service reform reduces compliance, it can interfere with the ability of elections to discipline or screen politicians.
I …nd that when there are few good bureaucrats, giving politicians control over them is desirable because it increases compliance and improves policy choices. This can be true even if politicians are worse than bureaucrats. By contrast, lowering political control through civil service protections will improve welfare provided that a large increase in bureaucratic quality can be realized. This highlights the importance of pairing civil service protections with improved bureaucrat selection, as in the early US reforms.
A tenure system increases bureaucrats'incentives to implement bad policies to replace a politician who does not share their preferences. Thus, tenure tends to make bureaucrats' performance worse, and this tends to lower welfare. Tenure can only be valuable when it improves the performance of the politician, or when the future gain from a higher quality bureaucracy o¤sets the short run welfare losses. For top-level bureaucrats prone to strategic behavior, the absence of tenure may be socially desirable to align their incentives with that of the politician. Alternatively, a tenure system paired with whistle-blower protections may be more advantageous.
The framework used here is a useful point of departure in analyzing the welfare e¤ects of civil service rules. As shown in Section 5, several of the assumptions can be relaxed without much di¢ culty. One interesting extension that is beyond the scope of this paper is allowing politicians'and / or bureaucrats'quality to emerge endogenously in the model. Indeed, standard citizen-candidate approaches would suggest that politicians'quality would respond to how civil service rules change the payo¤s accruing to di¤erent politicians in the model.
Similarly, bureaucrats'quality can be a¤ected by their incentive to work for the government or the private sector, by politicians' incentives to hire certain types of bureaucrats, as in Ujhelyi and Calvo (2013) , and by bureaucrats' incentives to acquire expertise, as in Gailmard and Patty (2007) . Incorporating some of these features in the above model is an interesting avenue for future research.
While the focus of this paper has been normative, there exists empirical evidence consistent with the basic observation that civil service reform a¤ects politicians' performance and can, under some conditions, lead to worse policies being adopted. In particular, Ujhelyi (2014) shows that the adoption of civil service protections in US state governments throughout the 20th century caused state politicians to reallocate spending towards local (unreformed) governments. Moreover, these institutional changes were accompanied by decreased spending on infrastructure and long-term capital projects.
The above results show that societies currently engaged in reforming the operation of their bureaucracies may face trade-o¤s between improving the performance of bureaucrats or the performance of politicians, especially in the context of a well-functioning electoral system. Apart from their direct e¤ect on bureaucrats, optimal reform should also consider the e¤ect of civil service rules on both the policy-making and the electoral process.
payo¤ from being reelected when the bureaucrat complies, and the second term represents the rent collected when the bureaucrat does not comply. The expected payo¤ from choosing a bad policy is (1 B ) ( B R + V 0 ) + B R 1 : Comparing the two, a bad politician chooses the good policy in period 1 if and only if the realization of R 1 satis…es (4). Ex ante, a bad politician choosing a good policy has probability = G( ( B R + V 0 )
). Thus, voters'belief that the incumbent is good conditional on a good policy being implemented iŝ
while the probability that he is good conditional on a bad implemented policy iŝ
Since^ j e=S ^ j e=1 S , it is indeed in voters'best interest to reelect the politician when they learn that a good policy was implemented, and to not reelect him after a bad policy.
Thus, we have an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. Imagine nature picking two politicians, one for period 1 who takes o¢ ce, and one for period 2 who takes o¢ ce if voters do not reelect the …rst one. Then E 2 = S 2 if both politicians are good (with probability 2 ), if the …rst one is good, the second one bad, but the …rst one is reelected (with probability (1 ) G ), or if the …rst one is bad, the second one good, and the …rst one is not reelected (with probability
. The probability of a good policy being chosen, i.e., a good politician being in o¢ ce in period 2 is therefore
and
0:
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We may use (2), (3) and (4) to obtain the probability that the politician chooses a good policy:
Pr(E 1 = S 1 ) = + (1 ) ; where = G (( I <h + 1 ) R + V 0 ) I <h + (1 )I r<h 1 + (I <h 1) + (1 )(I r<h 1)
We have = G[ ( R + V 0 )] when h > , = G[ ((1 ) R + V 0 )] when h 2 (r; ), and = 0 when h < r. Using the fact that G 0 > 0 and comparing these cases yields the stated results regarding the politician's choice. (ii) Using (2), (3), and (9), the quality of the period-2 politician is given by
Pr(E 2 = S 2 ) = 8 > > > > < > > > > :
Comparing these cases as above yields the results on the politician's quality. 
For period-2 welfare, Pr(e 2 = S 2 ) = Pr(E 2 = S 2 ) G + (1 Pr(E 2 = S 2 ))(1 B ). Thus, we have
Pr(e 2 = S 2 ) = 8 > > > > < > > > > :
Pr(E 2 = S 2 )(1 ) + if r < h < if h < r
Now (11), (12) , and (13) can be used to compute Pr(e 1 = S 1 ) + Pr(e 2 = S 2 ) in each case.
Comparing these establishes the results.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) This is easily shown by di¤erentiating (10) with respect to and using the fact that G 0 > 0.
(ii) To show this, di¤erentiate (11) with respect to : (iii)
Compute voter welfare as (Pr(e 1 = S 1 ) + Pr(e 2 = S 2 )) using (11), (12) , and (13), and di¤erentiate with respect to to obtain the result.
